Ratings are overrated! by Yannakakis, Georgios N. & Martinez, Hector P.
MINI REVIEW
published: 30 July 2015
doi: 10.3389/fict.2015.00013
Edited by:
Javier Jaen,
Universitat Politecnica de Valencia,
Spain
Reviewed by:
Andreas Duenser,
Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation,
Australia
Eran Toch,
Tel Aviv University, Israel
Donald Glowinski,
University of Geneva, Switzerland
*Correspondence:
Georgios N. Yannakakis,
Institute of Digital Games, University
of Malta, Msida 2080, Malta
georgios.yannakakis@um.edu.mt
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Human-Media Interaction, a section
of the journal Frontiers in ICT
Received: 01 April 2015
Accepted: 09 July 2015
Published: 30 July 2015
Citation:
Yannakakis GN and Martínez HP
(2015) Ratings are overrated!
Front. ICT 2:13.
doi: 10.3389/fict.2015.00013
Ratings are overrated!
Georgios N. Yannakakis* and Héctor P. Martínez
Institute of Digital Games, University of Malta, Msida, Malta
Are ratings of any use in human–computer interaction and user studies at large? If ratings
are of limited use, is there a better alternative for quantitative subjective assessment?
Beyond the intrinsic shortcomings of human reporting, there are a number of supple-
mentary limitations and fundamental methodological flaws associated with rating-based
questionnaires – i.e., questionnaires that ask participants to rate their level of agreement
with a given statement, such as a Likert item. While the effect of these pitfalls has been
largely downplayed, recent findings from diverse areas of study question the reliability
of using ratings. Rank-based questionnaires – i.e., questionnaires that ask participants
to rank two or more options – appear as the evident alternative that not only eliminates
the core limitations of ratings but also simplifies the use of sound methodologies that
yield more reliable models of the underlying reported construct: user emotion, preference,
or opinion. This paper solicits recent findings from various disciplines interlinked with
psychometrics and offers a quick guide for the use, processing, and analysis of rank-
based questionnaires for the unique advantages they offer. The paper challenges the
traditional state-of-practice in human–computer interaction and psychometrics directly
contributing toward a paradigm shift in subjective reporting.
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Introduction
The key research question within psychometrics and user studies is how to best approximate a
user’s notion of a subjective construct, such as an experience, a cognitive state, an emotion, or a
preference. Even though the ground truth of a user’s internal state can be manifested via numerous
cognitive processes or bodily alterations, it is still far from trivial how to best assess and process
those manifestations; entire research areas, such as user experience, user modeling, and affective
computing, are long dedicated to this task. Although subjective reporting (first- or third-person)
comes with several limitations, such as self-deception and memory-biases, it offers the most direct
and popular approach to the annotation of subjective constructs. Thus, quantitative reports via
questionnaires provide unique properties for evaluating the capacity of interactive systems (Bardram
et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2014) and for constructing computational models of reported user states
(Hernandez et al., 2014).
The dominant practice within human–computer interaction (HCI) for quantitatively assessing
aspects of a user’s behavior, experience, opinion, or emotion relies on subjective assessment via
rating-based questionnaires – see Bardram et al. (2013), Bryan et al. (2014), Chen et al. (2014), Goyal
et al. (2014), Hernandez et al. (2014), Mauderer et al. (2014), Schild et al. (2014), and Sonderegger
et al. (2014) amongmany. Indicatively, a thorough analysis of the papers published in the most pres-
tigiousHCI conference last year (Proceedings of CHI’14) reveals that themajority of accepted papers
use some form of quantitative assessment approach and more than 80% of these rely on rating-
based questionnaires. Popular rating-based questionnaires (see Figure 1A for an example) include
the Likert-scale (Likert, 1932), the Geneva Wheel model (Scherer, 2005), the Self-Assessment
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Rating: A 5-point Likert item example Rank: A 4-alternative forced choice example
A B
FIGURE 1 | Examples of rating-based (A) vs. rank-based
(B) questionnaires.
Manikin (Morris, 1995), the Positive andNegativeAffect Schedule
(Sonderegger et al., 2014), and the Game Experience Question-
naire (IJsselsteijn et al., 2008). The obtained answers are either
used as a means to evaluate an interactive system via the expe-
rience of its users – see Bryan et al. (2014), Chen et al. (2014),
and Mauderer et al. (2014) – or as data for building predictive
models of user reports – i.e., user modeling (Martínez et al., 2014;
Hernandez et al., 2014). On the other hand, rank-based question-
naires – which ask the participant to rank a preference between
two (or among more than two) options – still remain a rarely
used instrument of subjective assessment and modeling, even
though there is already significant evidence for their advantages
over rating-based questionnaires (Yannakakis and Hallam, 2011;
Metallinou and Narayanan, 2013; Čopič Pucihar et al., 2014).
An example of a rank-based questionnaire (4-alternative forced
choice) is illustrated in Figure 1B.
This paper contributes toward a shift of the current state-of-
practice in user experience, HCI, and psychometrics research
at large. For that purpose, the paper provides clear evidence
that rating-based evaluation (and modeling) is detrimental to
psychometrics and HCI research efforts as it points to biased
representations of a user’s subjective report. As a result, rating-
based instruments are not only of questionable use for the analysis
of a subject’s report but also evidently lead to unreliable models of
those subjects and their reports.
The paper is novel in that it collectively solicits empirical evi-
dence from various research fields, such as marketing research,
applied statistics, affective computing, user modeling, and user
experience to draw the multiple advantages of rank-based ques-
tionnaires for psychometrics and HCI research. At the same time,
it provides a comprehensive guide on the use, processing, and
analysis of rank-based questionnaires. Toward that aim, we object
the use of ratings for HCI based on a number of fundamental
limitations and practice flaws (see next section) and we provide
empirical evidence for the advantages of ranks (compared to rat-
ings) with respect to subjectivity, order, and inconsistency effects.
Furthermore, we suggest appropriate data processing techniques
on how to treat ratings – when those are available – and we
introduce an open-source toolbox that supports those techniques.
Ratings: Limitations and Fundamental
Flaws
The vast majority of user and psychometric studies have adopted
rating questionnaires to capture the opinions, preferences, and
perceived experiences of experiment participants – see Bryan et al.
(2014), Chen et al. (2014), and Mauderer et al. (2014) among
many. The most popular rating-based questionnaire follows the
principles of a Likert-scale (Likert, 1932) in which users are asked
to specify their level of agreement with (or disagreement against)
a given statement. Ratings have been used, for instance, to report
the level of comfort and ease of use of new interfaces or devices
(Chen et al., 2014; Weigel et al., 2014) or the stress level during a
given task – e.g., in Bardram et al. (2013) and Hernandez et al.
(2014). Rating-based reporting, however, has notable inherent
limitations that are often overlooked, resulting in fundamentally
flawed analyses (Jamieson, 2004). This section sheds some light
on the most critical of these limitations and flaws.
Inherent Limitation: Inter-Personal Differences
Traditionally, HCI studies analyze ratings by comparing their
values across participants – see Goyal et al. (2014) and Mark et al.
(2014) among many. This is a generally accepted and dominant
practice in the community but it neglects the existence of inter-
personal differences on the rating process as the meaning of each
level on a rating scale may differ across experiment participants.
For example, two participants may assess the exact same level of
“ease to use” for a new device but then one rates it as “very easy
to use” and the other as “extremely easy to use.” There are numer-
ous factors that contribute to the different internal rating scales
existent across participants (Metallinou and Narayanan, 2013),
such as differences in personality, culture (Sneddon et al., 2011),
temperament, and interests (Viswanathan, 1993). As these factors
are documented extensively in the literature, the appropriateness
of the dominant HCI state-of-practice is directly questioned.
A large volume of studies have also identified the presence
of primacy and recency order effects in rating-based question-
naires e.g., Chan (1991) and Yannakakis and Hallam (2011), seen
as systematic biases toward parts of the scale (Linn and Gron-
lund, 2000) (e.g., right handed participants may tend to use the
right side of the scale) or a fixed tendency over time (e.g., on a
series of experimental conditions, the last ones are rated higher).
Indicatively, the comparative study of Yannakakis and Hallam
(2011) between ratings and ranks showcases higher inconsistency
effects and significant order (recency) effects existent in ratings
across two different datasets, which contain both rank and rating
annotations obtained from the same participants. Although these
are systematic biases (opposed to personal), they pose additional
challenges on the comparison of ratings among participants, as
participants are affected to different extents. Even though exper-
iments on quantifying human perception through rating ques-
tionnaires have led to interesting findings on the relationship
between perception and reporting, biases of the use of ratings as
an assessment tool have not been examined (Jay et al., 2007).
Ratings are Not Numbers
In addition to inter-personal differences, a critical limitation
arises when ratings are treated as interval values since ratings
are by nature ordinal values (Stevens, 1946; Jamieson, 2004). As
a result, any method that treats them as numbers (e.g., aver-
age values, t-tests, linear models) is fundamentally flawed. In
most questionnaires, Likert items are represented as pictures
[e.g., different representations of arousal in the Self-Assessment
Manikin (Morris, 1995)] or as adjectives (e.g., “moderately,”
“fairly,” and “extremely”). These labels (images or adjectives) are
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often erroneously converted to integer numbers violating basic
axioms of statistics, which suggest that ordinal values cannot be
treated as interval values (Stevens, 1946) since the underlying
numerical scale is unknown. Note that even when a questionnaire
features ratings as numbers (e.g., see Figure 1A), the scale is still
ordinal as the numbers in the instrument are only labels; thus, the
underlying numerical scale is still unknown and dependent on the
participant (Stevens, 1946; Langley and Sheppeard, 1985; Ovadia,
2004). Moreover, when treated as numbers, equal ratings are con-
sidered of equal value. This is another invalid assumption tomake
as questionnaires do not always provide sufficient granularity. By
treating ratings as ordinal values, this issue is avoided as only the
relations among unequal values are considered.
The Non-Linearity of Ratings
Treating ratings as interval values is grounded in the assumption
that the difference between consecutive ratings is fixed (i.e., rat-
ings follow a linear scale). However, there is no valid assumption
suggesting that a subjective rating scale is linear (Jamieson, 2004).
For instance, the difference between “fairly (4)” and “extremely
(5)” may be larger than the distance between “moderately (3)”
and “fairly (4)” as some experiment participants rarely use the
extremes of the scale or tend to use one extreme more than
the other (Langley and Sheppeard, 1985). If, instead, ratings are
treated naturally as ordinal data no assumptions are made about
the distance between rating labels, which eliminates introducing
flawed information and data noise to the analysis.
Why Should I Use Ranks Instead?
A rank-based questionnaire scheme asks experiment participants
to compare and sort a number of options. On its simplest form,
the participants compare two options and specify which one is
the preferred under a given statement (pairwise preference). For
instance, participants could select which of two devices is easier
to use. With more than two options, the participants are asked
to provide a ranking of some or all the options. At a remote
observation, one may argue that ranks provide less information
than ratings as they do not express a quantity explicitly and only
provide ordinal relations. As argued in the previous section, how-
ever, any additional information obtained by ratings when treated
as numbers violates basic axioms of applied statistics. Thus, ratings
do not provide data for a richer analysis if appropriately treated as
ordinal values.
Being a form of subjective reporting rank-based questionnaires
(as much as rating-based questionnaires) is associated with well
known limitations, such as memory effects and self-deception.
Reporting about subjective constructs, such as experience,
preference, or emotion via rank-based questionnaires, however,
has recently attracted the interest of researchers in marketing
(Dhar and Simonson, 2003), psychology (Brown and Maydeu-
Olivares, 2013), user modeling (Yang and Chen, 2011; Baveye
et al., 2013), and affective computing (Tognetti et al., 2010;
Martínez et al., 2014) among other fields. This gradual paradigm
shift is driven by both the reported benefits of ranks minimizing
the effects of self-reporting subjectivity and recent findings
demonstrating the advantages of ranks over ratings. Inspired
by the seminal work of Scheffe (1952) and Agresti (1992) for
the analysis of paired comparisons Yannakakis and Hallam
(2011) compared data from rating and rank-based questionnaires
across a number of domains and identified increased order
and inconsistency effects when ratings are used. Evidence from
findings by Metallinou and Narayanan (2013) also suggest
that rank-based annotation of emotion should be preferred to
rating-based annotation for its ability to eliminate annotation
biases (cultural, subjective, inconsistency, inter-rater, etc.).
In summary, results across different domains investigating
subjective assessment suggest that rank-based reports minimize
the assumptions made about experiment participants’ notions of
highly subjective constructs, such as experience and emotions,
and allow a fair comparison among the answers of different par-
ticipants. Moreover, artifacts, such as the subjective notion of
scaling, are eliminated. Finally, all these advantages also lead to the
construction of generalizable and accurate computational models
of users or their experience (Martínez et al., 2014).
What if Ratings is All I Have?
The core findings from the areas of applied statistics, user mod-
eling, affective computing, machine learning, and marketing
research discussed already not only suggest that ranks define a
superior instrument for subjective assessment but they also ques-
tion the very use of ratings at the first place. One could, however,
still claim that the use of ratings in some particular experimental
protocols is unavoidable. For instance, in experimental protocols,
subjects can only be asked to assess their experience on solely one
version of an interactive system (e.g., a game, a web-browser).
When facedwith such a condition ratings could provide a viable
assessment instrument if they are naturally treated as ordinal data.
A recent study by Martínez et al. (2014) investigates the effect
of using ratings as nominal or ordinal scales when studying the
relation between physiological attributes and emotional states.
Both approaches are tested on synthetic (testing “in vitro”) and
human (testing “in vivo”) ratings. The core findings of the study
across all datasets examined provide clear evidence that ratings
(when used) should be naturally transformed to ordinal represen-
tations (ranks). This practice has clear benefits: any data analysis
followed yields more reliable and generalizable outcomes as those
better approximate the underlying ground truth of the reported
subjective construct. The transformation from ratings to ranks
is straightforward. Ratings are compared to one another and a
pairwise preference/ranking is created for every pair/tuple; higher
ratings take the top positions of the ranking and lower ratings the
positions in the bottom of the ranking. Comparisons of ratings
from different experiment participants must be avoided. In addi-
tion, if the time window between reported ratings is sufficiently
large for the examined task (e.g., in the magnitude of hours or
more) one can also consider removing particular rating pairs to
reduce artifacts connected to participants’ episodic memory.
In general, approaches for analyzing ordinal ratings should
rely on non-parametric statistics: from simple statistical
explorations via Spearman’s correlation, to significance tests
via the Mann–Whitney test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for
paired samples (Wilcoxon, 1945), to the Kruskal–Wallis (Kruskal
and Wallis, 1952) and Friedman’s (Friedman, 1940) tests for three
(or more) groups of ranks. Clearly, statistical models, such as
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artificial neural networks and support vector machines, are also
suitable for the analysis of ordinal data (Martínez et al., 2014).
Norman (2010) showed empirically in one dataset that Pear-
son’s correlation (which treats ratings as intervals) is robust
enough when compared against Spearman’s rank correlation
(which treats ratings as ordinal values). Such evidence could sup-
port the validity of using standard parametric correlation tests
that treat ratings as interval values but does not question the very
use of ratings due to their inherent limitations. On the contrary,
a number of studies have demonstrated the supremacy of ranks
in eliminating various forms of reporting biases [e.g., Yannakakis
and Hallam (2011)]. Finally, significant improvements have been
reported in accuracies of non-linear statistical models when rat-
ings are treated as ordinal values (Martínez et al., 2014).
How to Analyze Ranks
Standard data visualization methods based on averages or SDs are
strictly not applicable on ordinal data – obtained directly as ranks
or transformed from ratings. Instead, to explore the relationships
between ranks and a number of considered factors, a stacked
bar chart can be used to visualize how many observations were
assigned to each rank for each value of the factor.
For a statistical factor analysis, a common choice is theWilcoxon
signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945), sometimes also used to evaluate
the effect of ratings as, for instance, in Mauderer et al. (2014).
This is a paired-samples test and, therefore, guarantees that only
within-participant ranks are compared, bypassing inter-personal
differences. A common alternative isKendall’s Tau (Kendall, 1938)
that can be used to calculate the correlation between the hypoth-
esized order (e.g., device A is easier to use than device B) and
the observed ranks – see, e.g., Martínez et al. (2014). The non-
parametric Kruskal–Wallis and Friedman’s tests mentioned earlier
are also applicable.
Furthermore, if an HCI researcher is interested in using the
reported ranks to build computational models that predict those
ranks (e.g., constructing models of users) a large palette of algo-
rithms is currently available. Linear statistical models, such as
linear discriminant analysis and large margins, and non-linear
approaches, such asGaussian processes, artificial neural networks,
and support vectormachines, are applicable for learning to predict
ranks. These methods are derived from the sub-area of machine
learning named preference learning (Fürnkranz and Hüllermeier,
2010). A number of such preference learning methods as well
as data preprocessing and feature selection algorithms are cur-
rently included in the preference learning toolbox (PLT) (Farrugia
et al., 2015). PLT is an open-access, user-friendly, and accessible
toolkit1 built and constantly updated for the purpose of easing the
processing of (and promoting the use of) ranks.
Summary of Conclusions
This paper directly objects to the use and analysis of subjective
assessment via ratings within quantitative user studies, HCI and
psychometrics research contributing to a shift from the domi-
nant state of practice in those fields. Beyond any well-reported
1http://sourceforge.net/projects/pl-toolbox/
limitations of subjective reporting (e.g., memory effects, self-
deception) ratings come with inherited limitations as an instru-
ment of reporting. These are derived from inter-personal differ-
ences and include, among many, high-inconsistency effects and
subjectivity of scaling. Those effects question the very use of
ratings for obtaining valid data for any further analysis. Most
importantly, the traditional analysis of ratings within HCI and
psychometrics – i.e., deriving statistical properties from ratings,
such as average and variance values – violates two fundamen-
tal assumptions. The first common flaw is the violation of the
assumption that ratings are ordinal data. The second assumption
violated is that ratings evidently are not linear (even if they could
be represented as numbers). In response to the above mathemat-
ical violations, in principle, ratings should not be converted to
numerical scales and analyzed as numbers.
Rank-based questionnaires are the alternative instrument
for subjective quantitative assessment proposed in this paper.
Recent findings from a number of fields including applied
statistics, affective computing, user modeling, and machine
learning provide clear evidence for the supremacy of ranks, when
compared to ratings, on minimizing subjectivity biases as well
as order, inter-rater, and inconsistency effects (Yannakakis and
Hallam, 2011; Metallinou and Narayanan, 2013). More so, recent
evidence suggests that we can constructmore accurate and reliable
statistical models of reported ratings – that better approximate the
underlying ground truth of the subjective construct we attempt
to measure – only when ratings are naturally treated as ordinal
data (Martínez et al., 2014).
Given the supremacy or rank-based subjective assessment for
both evaluating interactive systems (through the experience of
their users) and as the ground truth for deriving computational
models of subjective reports, this paper serves as a guide for both
rank-based evaluation and rank-based computational modeling.
For the former, it providesmethods for the conversion of ratings to
ranks – when ratings are available – and an overview of statistical
processes for rank reports. For the latter, it proposes preference
learning methods and algorithms – incorporated to an open-
source, accessible toolbox – for the construction of predictive
models of ranks.
It is important to stress that this paper did not intend to present
yet another case study to further prove empirically the advan-
tages of ranks over ratings or demonstrate the general flaws of
processing ratings. Our claims are not based on the popularity
of ranks in other fields outside HCI, but on empirical findings
as surveyed in the paper. While the limitations of ratings and
ranks have been identified and discussed extensively, no other
study within the HCI community both solicits evidence for the
comparative advantages of ranks (as demonstrated in other fields)
and offers a short guidebook on how to process ranks statistically.
We hope that this paper highlights the obvious fundamental issues
of ratings as a subjective assessment tool and introduces ranks as
the alternative reporting approach toward altering a dominant, yet
falsified, community practice.
Acknowledgments
The work is supported, in part, by the EU-funded FP7 ICT
ILearnRW project (project no: 318803).
Frontiers in ICT | www.frontiersin.org July 2015 | Volume 2 | Article 134
Yannakakis and Martínez Ratings are overrated!
References
Agresti, A. (1992). Analysis of ordinal paired comparison data. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. C
Appl. Stat. 41, 287–297.
Bardram, J. E., Frost, M., Szántó, K., Faurholt-Jepsen, M., Vinberg, M., and Kessing,
L. V. (2013). Designing mobile health technology for bipolar disorder: a field
trial of the monarca system. Proc. SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factor. Comput. Syst.
2627–2636. doi:10.1145/2470654.2481364
Baveye, Y., Bettinelli, J. N., Dellandrea, E., Chen, L., and Chamaret, C. (2013). A
large video database for computational models of induced emotion. Proc. of
Affect. Comput. Intell. Int. 13–18. doi:10.1109/ACII.2013.9
Brown, A., and Maydeu-Olivares, A. (2013). How irt can solve problems of ipsative
data in forced-choice questionnaires. Psychol. Methods 18, 36. doi:10.1037/
a0030641
Bryan, N. J., Mysore, G. J., and Wang, G. (2014). Isse: an interactive source
separation editor. Proc. SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factor. Comput. Syst. 257–266.
doi:10.1145/2556288.2557253
Chan, J. C. (1991). Response-order effects in Likert-type scales. Educ. Psychol.Meas.
51, 531–540. doi:10.1177/0013164491513002
Chen, X. A., Grossman, T., Wigdor, D. J., and Fitzmaurice, G. (2014). Duet:
exploring joint interactions on a smart phone and a smart watch. Proc. SIGCHI
Conf. Hum. Factor. Comput. Syst. 159–168. doi:10.1145/2556288.2556955
Čopič Pucihar, K., Coulton, P., and Alexander, J. (2014). The use of surround-
ing visual context in handheld ar: device vs. user perspective rendering.
Proc. SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factor. Comput. Syst. 197–206. doi:10.1145/2556288.
2557125
Dhar, R., and Simonson, I. (2003). The effect of forced choice on choice. J. Market.
Res. 40, 146–160. doi:10.1509/jmkr.40.2.146.19229
Farrugia, V. E., Martínez, H. P., and Yannakakis, G. N. (2015). The preference
learning toolbox. [arXiv:1506.01709].
Friedman, M. (1940). A comparison of alternative tests of significance for the prob-
lem of m rankings. Ann. Math. Stat. 11, 86–92. doi:10.1214/aoms/1177731944
Fürnkranz, J., and Hüllermeier, E. (2010). Preference Learning. New York: Springer.
Goyal, N., Leshed, G., Cosley, D., and Fussell, S. R. (2014). Effects of implicit
sharing in collaborative analysis. Proc. SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factor. Comput. Syst.
129–138. doi:10.1145/2556288.2557229
Hernandez, J., Paredes, P., Roseway, A., and Czerwinski, M. (2014). Under pressure:
sensing stress of computer users. Proc. SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factor. Comput. Syst.
51–60. doi:10.1145/2556288.2557165
IJsselsteijn, W., Poels, K., and De Kort, Y. (2008). The Game Experience Ques-
tionnaire: Development of a Self-Report Measure to Assess Player Experiences of
Digital Games. Eindhoven: TU Eindhoven.
Jamieson, S. (2004). Likert scales: how to (ab) use them.Med. Educ. 38, 1217–1218.
doi:10.1111/j.1365-2929.2004.02012.x
Jay, C., Glencross, M., and Hubbold, R. (2007). Modeling the effects of delayed
haptic and visual feedback in a collaborative virtual environment. ACM Trans.
Comput. Hum. Interact. 14, 1275514. doi:10.1145/1275511
Kendall, M. G. (1938). A new measure of rank correlation. Biometrika 81–93.
doi:10.1093/biomet/30.1-2.81
Kruskal, W. H., and Wallis, W. A. (1952). Use of ranks in one-criterion
variance analysis. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 47, 583–621. doi:10.1080/01621459.1952.
10483441
Langley, G., and Sheppeard, H. (1985). The visual analogue scale: its use in pain
measurement. Rheumatol. Int. 5, 145–148. doi:10.1007/BF00541514
Likert, R. (1932). A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Arch. Psychol. 140,
1–55.
Linn, R., andGronlund, N. (2000).Measurement and Assessment in Teaching. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Mark, G., Wang, Y., and Niiya, M. (2014). Stress and multitasking in everyday
college life: an empirical study of online activity. Proc. SIGCHI Conf. Hum.
Factor. Comput. Syst. 41–50. doi:10.1145/2556288.2557361
Martínez, H. P., Yannakakis, G. N., and Hallam, J. (2014). Don’t classify ratings of
affect; rank them! IEEE Trans. Affect. Comput. 5, 314–326. doi:10.1109/TAFFC.
2014.2352268
Mauderer, M., Conte, S., Nacenta, M. A., and Vishwanath, D. (2014). Depth per-
ception with gaze-contingent depth of field. Proc. SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factor.
Comput. Syst. 217–226. doi:10.1145/2556288.2557089
Metallinou, A., and Narayanan, S. (2013). “Annotation and processing of con-
tinuous emotional attributes: challenges and opportunities,” in Automatic Face
and Gesture Recognition (FG), 2013 10th IEEE International Conference and
Workshops on (Shanghai: IEEE), 1–8.
Morris, J. (1995). Observations: sam: the self-assessmentManikinan efficient cross-
cultural measurement of emotional response. J. Advert. Res. 35, 63–68.
Norman, G. (2010). Likert scales, levels of measurement and the laws of statistics.
Adv. Health Sci. Educ. 15, 625–632. doi:10.1007/s10459-010-9222-y
Ovadia, S. (2004). Ratings and rankings: reconsidering the structure of values
and their measurement. Int. J. Soc. Res. Method. 7, 403–414. doi:10.1080/
1364557032000081654
Scheffe,H. (1952). An analysis of variance for paired comparisons. J. Am. Stat. Assoc.
47, 381–400. doi:10.2307/2281310
Scherer, K. (2005). What are emotions? and how can they be measured? Soc. Sci.
Inform. 44, 695–729. doi:10.1177/0539018405058216
Schild, J., La Viola, J. J. Jr., and Masuch, M. (2014). Altering gameplay behavior
using stereoscopic 3d vision-based video game design. Proc. SIGCHI Conf. Hum.
Factor. Comput. Syst. 207–216. doi:10.1145/2556288.2557283
Sneddon, I., McKeown, G., McRorie, M., and Vukicevic, T. (2011). Cross-
cultural patterns in dynamic ratings of positive and negative natural emotional
behaviour. PLoS ONE 6:e14679. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014679
Sonderegger, A., Uebelbacher, A., Pugliese, M., and Sauer, J. (2014). “The influence
of aesthetics in usability testing: the case of dual-domain products,” in Proceed-
ings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (New
York, NY: ACM), 21–30.
Stevens, S. S. (1946). On the theory of scales of measurement. Science 103, 677–680.
doi:10.1126/science.103.2684.677
Tognetti, S., Garbarino, M., Bonarini, A., and Matteucci, M. (2010). “Modeling
enjoyment preference from physiological responses in a car racing game,” Com-
putational Intelligence and Games (CIG), 2010 IEEE Symposium on (Copen-
hagen: IEEE), 321–328.
Viswanathan, M. (1993). Measurement of individual differences in preference for
numerical information. J. Appl. Psychol. 78, 741–752. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.78.
5.741
Weigel, M., Mehta, V., and Steimle, J. (2014). More than touch: understanding how
people use skin as an input surface for mobile computing. Proc. SIGCHI Conf.
Hum. Factor. Comput. Syst. 179–188. doi:10.1145/2556288.2557239
Wilcoxon, F. (1945). Individual comparisons by ranking methods. Biometrics Bull.
80–83. doi:10.2307/3001968
Yang, Y. H., and Chen, H. H. (2011). Ranking-based emotion recognition for music
organization and retrieval. IEEE Trans. Audio Speech Lang. Process. 19, 762–774.
doi:10.1109/TASL.2010.2064164
Yannakakis, G. N., and Hallam, J. (2011). Rating vs. preference: a comparative study
of self-reporting. Proc. Affect. Comput. Intell. Int. 6974, 437–446. doi:10.1007/
978-3-642-24600-5_47
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Yannakakis andMartínez. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s)
or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in ICT | www.frontiersin.org July 2015 | Volume 2 | Article 135
